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In this paper two models of investment stemming from the neoclassical theory are 
derived in a unifying framework. The Q type models view the stock market valuation 
of a firm as an all-encompassing variable determining its investment decisions, while 
the Euler equation for investment highlights the dynamic nature of firms’ decision-
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 1. Introduction 
Firm investment is an interesting decision to be made from both a 
microeconomic and a macroeconomic point of view. From a micro point of view it is 
interesting because firm investment in the present will influence the quantity of 
capital available in the future for the production process. But since it represents an 
outlay in the present, a balance has to be struck between the cost of investment today 
against the future profits expected from it. Hence, from a micro point of view 
investment can be formulated as a dynamic optimization problem, since it involves 
intertemporal allocation of resources. 
From a macro point of view aggregate investment is important as a direct 
determinant of aggregate demand. Moreover, investment increases the productive 
capacity of the economy. Investment in capital is sensitive to interest rates since firms 
need to raise funds in order to finance their investment projects. Hence aggregate 
investment is sensitive to monetary policy. The structure of capital markets also plays 
an important role for investment, as it determines the availability of funds for the 
realisation of investment projects. 
Starting from the formulation of a dynamic optimization problem, where a 
firm maximizes its intertemporal flow of revenues by choosing an appropriate 
investment path over time, three lines of research have prevailed in the empirical 
literature on firm investment. The first involves the identification of investment 
opportunities, captured by average Q, i.e. the ratio of market value of capital to its 
replacement cost (Hayashi, 1982). The second methodology consists in the derivation 
and estimation of an Euler equation, which highlights the intertemporal character of 
investment (Abel, 1980; Shapiro, 1986; Bond and Meghir, 1994). Finally, the third 
line of research involves a methodology for forecasting marginal revenue generated 
by new capital in the framework of a VAR model (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). This 
last method has been criticised on the grounds that it is subject to the Lucas’ critique.  
The variety of empirical work using Q  models and Euler equations for 
investment highlights the advantages and shortcomings of the two approaches, but 
most importantly, it quite often leads to the finding that the behaviour implied by the 
neoclassical investment story is rejected for a given sample of firms or at least for 
sub-samples with certain characteristics (e.g. size, dividend policy, etc.) which could 
  5reveal financial constraints. Notwithstanding the technical shortcomings of some 
estimation methods, this failure is often attributed to financial market imperfections.  
The Euler equation for investment is an alternative formulation of the solution 
to the neoclassical capital accumulation problem, but it is free from the empirical 
caveats of the Q model. First, it remains uncontaminated in case of measurement error 
or endogeneity of Q. Second, it is straight-forward to implement even in case of 
imperfect competition in output markets. Therefore an estimation of both empirical 
models using the same sample of firms for the same period of time would constitute a 
natural test for the validity of the neoclassical assumptions on which the two models 
are based. A bad empirical fit of both models could be an indication of invalidity of 
the neoclassical story. If, however, one of the two approaches appears to be superior, 
then failure of the other approach should not be necessarily taken as indication of 
invalidity of the neoclassical assumptions, but could be rather attributed to the 
particularities of the specific methodology.  
This paper attempts a comparison of the empirical fit of the Q model and the 
Euler equation for investment on the basis of UK manufacturing data for the period 
1971-1990. For this purpose the two models are derived in a unifying framework 
based on the firm’s dynamic optimization problem (Part 2), so that analogies can be 
drawn. In Part 3 the data set and the empirical specifications are presented and results 
are reported, while Part 4 concludes. 
2. Firm investment: A unifying analytical framework 
Theoretical models of investment evolved in the last fifty years basically due 
to the need to rationalize the prevalent empirical models and their findings in a 
theoretically appealing framework. One of the earliest versions of empirical 
investment models was the accelerator model, which explained investment on the 
basis of current and lagged changes of sales growth. Although this type of model did 
not perform badly in fitting the data, it lacked a convincing theoretical background. 
The neoclassical investment theory views investment as a choice variable for 
managers, whose objective is to maximize the firm’s value for its shareholders. The 
first version of the neoclassical model developed by Jorgenson (1963) assumed a CRS 
technology producing an exogenously given amount of output and used an ad hoc rule 
for investment evolution to tie down the investment rate. The result is a specification 
  6in which the investment rate is determined by the user cost of capital.
1 Despite the 
simplicity and intuitiveness of this specification, empirical models using aggregate 
investment data failed to deliver evidence of its validity in practice. 
The late versions of the neoclassical investment model use convex installation 
costs of new capital to deliver a q
2 model of investment (Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968; 
Uzawa, 1969; Treadway, 1969). Marginal q is defined as the ratio of the marginal 
revenue product of an additional unit of capital to the marginal cost of its installation 
and it was viewed at that time as an all-encompassing variable which summarizes 
firms’ investment opportunities (controlling also for changes in the user cost of 
capital) and determines their investment rates. When q is larger than 1, i.e. when the 
marginal capital unit adds to a firm’s value more than its cost, then it is profitable for 
the firm to install new capital and hence investment increases. The opposite happens 
when q is less than 1, while q=1 means that the firm will be indifferent between 
undertaking an investment project or not. 
One problem associated with the empirical estimation of q models which was 
identified early on in the literature, is that marginal q  is unobservable to the 
econometrician. Hayashi (1982) showed that under a number of additional 
assumptions (perfect competition in the product market and linear homogeneity of the 
production and adjustment cost functions) marginal q is equal to average Q, where 
average Q is the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of installed 
capital. In contrast to marginal q, average Q can be constructed from stock market 
data
3 and hence an investment model based on average Q  can be estimated in 
practice. 
The empirical relevance of average Q for investment is however not 
undisputed. On the contrary, the assumption of perfect competition in product markets 
is obviously questionable, although there are ways to keep the main framework intact 
                                                 
1 The user cost of capital is the return required by firms in order to undertake an investment, gross of 
depreciation (see Bond and Jenkinson, 1996). 
2 A notational distinction should be made between small q, referring to marginal q, i.e. the additional 
value generated for the firm by the marginal unit of capital relative to its cost, and large Q, which refers 
to average Q, i.e. the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its capital. 
3 For another approach of estimating marginal q on the basis of a VAR model, see Abel and Blanchard 
(1986). Their results confirm the main findings of the average Q empirical literature, thus supporting 
the view that measurement errors or endogeneity biases are not the main driving forces of the results. 
However, as already mentioned their methodology has been criticized as being subject to the Lucas’ 
critique. 
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4 but additional issues regarding the correct valuation of 
a firm’s assets in stock markets in the presence of information asymmetries and even 
the incentives of managers to maximize the firm’s value are questioned in the 
literature. Also, two technical problems could arise regarding average Q. The first is a 
measurement error in observed Q  which could lead to biased (downwards) and 
inconsistent estimates in a regression of the investment rate on Q. A measurement 
error can result from a discrepancy between marginal and average Q (due to output 
market imperfections), or between average Q  and Tobin’s q  (due to information 
asymmetries in the capital markets), but it can also arise from the construction of the 
replacement cost of capital series. As has been shown by Griliches and Hausman 
(1986), under certain assumptions regarding the process of the measurement error, 
this problem can be addressed by implementing an IV approach with lagged values of 
Q used as instruments.
5 Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) just estimate the model 
in first differences, although Griliches and Hausman (1986) show that this could 
exacerbate the measurement bias. A second problem which might arise is endogeneity 
of Q. Since marginal q is the present value of current and future profits arising from 
the marginal unit of capital, a positive shock to the adjustment cost function at time t 
will affect investment directly but also by increasing q due to the increase in expected 
future profitability. However, also this problem can be dealt with by using an 
appropriate GMM procedure for the estimation of the investment equation. For 
example Hayashi and Inoue (1991) achieve identification under the assumption of 
specific stochastic properties for the error term in the investment equation, by 
applying a GMM procedure where leads and lags of investment, Q and cash-flows are 
used as instruments. 
Apart from the construction and the stochastic properties of Q, investment 
models based on it lead to puzzling results when cash-flow terms are added. It has 
been a common finding across a number of studies that cash-flow has a statistically 
                                                 
4 If the perfect competition in the product market assumption is dropped, then average Q will be higher 
than marginal q and the wedge between them equals the monopoly rent (Hayashi, 1982). For an 
empirical application on UK data see Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990). 
5 For a different treatment of measurement error in Q see Erickson and Whited (2000). They apply a 
GMM procedure exploiting information included in higher than second order moments of the observed 
variables, derive an overidentified system and then obtain the J-test of overidentifying restrictions to 
test for departures from the assumptions necessary for the consistency of their estimators. Their results 
imply that measurement error can explain the low explanatory power, the high adjustment costs and the 
statistical significance of other variables like cash-flows, which are frequently found in the empirical 
literature on Q models of investment. 
  8significant positive effect when added to Q models of investment. There are three 
alternative interpretations in the literature for this finding. The first points out that 
cash-flow is closely correlated with profits and sales and hence it adds more 
information on firm profitability and investment opportunities in a Q  model, 
especially if observed Q displays a measurement error. Furthermore in the case of a 
firm which has monopoly power in the market for the good it produces, the marginal 
revenue of capital is not just equal to the average profit of installed capital, but is 
augmented by an additional output term scaled by the elasticity of demand (Hayashi, 
1982). In this case the statistical significance of cash-flow in a Q model could be an 
indication of imperfect competition in the goods market. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) find that the statistical significance of the coefficient on cash-flow 
persists even after controlling for output by including a lagged sales-to-capital term. 
As will be shown in the next section however, the treatment of imperfect competition 
in the framework of the Q model is more complicated. 
An alternative explanation put forward for the significance of cash-flow is that 
sometimes managers use free cash-flow (cash-flow left after investment in profitable 
projects has been realised) to overinvest, i.e. that they engage in suboptimal 
investment policies, in which case the Q model is not an appropriate description of 
firm investment behavior (see Jensen, 1986). It could also be the case that managers 
engage in suboptimal financing strategies for profitable investment projects, e.g. that 
they show a preference for internal funds rather than external financing contracts 
which could make them subject to restrictive covenants and scrutiny. This free cash-
flow story could provide an interpretation for the statistical significance of cash-flow 
in Q models of investment. However, it is very difficult to test as free cash-flow 
cannot be observed.  
The third and dominant interpretation in the literature is that the empirical 
significance of cash-flow terms in Q specifications reflects the existence of financing 
hierarchies associated with financial market imperfections. According to this 
argument, the explanatory power of cash-flow can be attributed to the fact that it is a 
proxy for the firm’s net worth and as such it determines the external finance premium 
facing the firm (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Chirinko and Schaller, 
1995). Hence, despite the theoretical appeal of Q as a measure of investment 
opportunities, the empirical application in the estimation of investment models failed 
to establish it as the undisputed determinant of firm investment behavior. 
  9To circumvent some of the empirical caveats of Q  models, an alternative 
methodology has been developed to derive an Euler equation for investment in the 
neoclassical framework. Again, with the assumption of convex installation costs and 
linear homogeneity of the production and adjustment cost functions one can derive a 
specification in which the investment rate is determined by linear and quadratic terms 
of the lagged investment rate, as well as lags of cash-flow and the cost of capital.
6 
One important advantage of the Euler equation approach is that it does not rely on the 
construction of a summary measure like average Q. Hence, it can be estimated even 
for companies which are not quoted on a stock market and its validity cannot be 
questioned on the basis of measurement errors or endogeneity of the regressors. 
Among its potential pitfalls however is the fact that the role of various determinants of 
investment (e.g. in capturing investment opportunities, availability of finance, 
management incentives etc.) is obscured. Moreover, Mairesse (1994) has shown that 
Euler equations for investment demonstrate parameter instability, which could again 
be blamed on capital market imperfections, but could in fact be associated with a 
more general specification problem. Finally, the fact that it rests largely on the same 
assumptions as the Q model, especially regarding perfect financial markets and 
management incentives to maximize firm value (instead of e.g. firm size to gain 
personal power), renders it subject to the earlier mentioned relevant criticism. 
Given the dominance of the neoclassical investment theory, the empirical 
literature on investment has mainly focused on (variants of) the Q model and the 
Euler equation of investment. There are a number of studies published using data for 
various developed and developing countries (see e.g. Bond and Meghir, 1994, for the 
UK; Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, for the US; Hayashi and Inoue, 1991, for 
Japan; Athey and Laumas, 1994, for India; Cho, 1995, for Korea; Bond, Elston, 
Mairesse and Mulkay, 1995, for France, Belgium, Germany and the UK). Although 
the bulk of studies focuses on manufacturing, both because of its important role for 
aggregate output and employment and because of data availability, there are a few 
studies from other sectors or specific type of firms, covering e.g. agriculture (Hubbard 
and Kashyap, 1992), high-tech industry (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) and 
hospital services (Calem and Rizzo, 1995). Moreover, different types of investment 
expenditure have been studied, like inventory investment (Carpenter, Fazzari and 
                                                 
6 If the firm is assumed to have some monopoly power in the output market, an additional output term 
will be included in the Euler equation for investment (see section 2.2). 
  10Petersen, 1994), R&D expenditure (Hall, 1992), investment in equipment (DeLong 
and Summers, 1991), labour demand (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1995) and investment in 
market share under imperfect competition (Phillips, 1995), although again the bulk of 
evidence relates to business fixed investment in general (plants, buildings and 
equipment). 
2.1 Investment behavior of an optimizing firm under perfect competition 
At each point in time a representative firm
7 maximizes its value, which is a 
function of the previous period stock of capital. The firm cannot control the stock of 
capital available to it in each period, but it can influence the pattern of capital 
accumulation by appropriately choosing an investment rate. Hence the firm’s problem 
can be summarized as follows: 
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where   is the firm’s current period value function, β is a discount factor, E ) ( 1 − t t K V t is the 
expectations operator based on the time t  information set, and   is the net 
revenue, given by: 
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In expression (2)  is a production function and  is a cost-of-adjustment function. K, L 
and I stand for capital, labour and investment, respectively,
(.) F (.) C
8 wt is the wage rate,   is the 
price of the firm’s product and   is the price of investment goods. The subscript t denotes 
time. The revenue function can easily become stochastic if a technology shock in the 
production function or in the cost-of-adjustment function is allowed for. A positive shock 
would increase net output and, given prices, it would also increase firm revenue. The 
representation of the firm’s problem as in equation (1) reduces an optimization problem with 
an infinite horizon to the equivalent two-period problem. At the beginning of the period the 
firm chooses an investment rate, so that new capital is installed, which becomes operative 




                                                 
7 The representative firm assumption enables us to drop the i subscript for firm in this and the following 
section. We assume a unique capital input. For a model with multiple capital goods, see Hayashi and 
Inoue, 1991. 
8 Capital and labour are assumed to be the only inputs to production. 
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with  δ denoting a constant depreciation rate. The firm faces convex installation costs 
increasing in investment, i.e. the higher the investment in proportion to existing capital the 
higher the costs in terms of lost output. This can be thought of as implying that a big 
investment project causes a relatively larger disruption in production (time and cost associated 
with the installation of new machinery, training workers etc.) than a small project. Adjustment 
costs are given by the cost-of-adjustment function,  . We assume that both the 
production function,  , and the cost-of-adjustment function are homogeneously 
linear in capital. In order to be able to derive an expression for the investment rate, we need to 
specify a functional form for the cost of adjustment function. The most common form in the 
literature is the quadratic, given by: 
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Under perfect competition the first order conditions for the firm’s 
maximization problem
9 with respect to previous period capital stock give: 
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Equation (5’) has a straight forward economic interpretation. It states that the 
shadow value of capital, i.e. the additional value for the firm from relaxing constraint 
(3), is equal to the discounted value of current and future revenues generated by the 
marginal unit of capital. The first order condition with respect to investment then 
gives: 
                                                 
9 The firm maximizes its value function subject to the capital formation constraint (3), so that the 
Langrangean corresponding to the firm’s problem as we formulated it here is: 
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As has been pointed out previously the literature on investment has used the 
first order conditions of this optimization problem to derive an expression for 
investment in various fashions. One way to go from here is to use (6) to derive an 
investment equation based on average Q [Hayashi (1982)]. Another way would be to 
combine (5’) and (6) to derive the Euler equation for investment [Bond and Meghir 
(1994)]. 
2.1.1 A Q model of investment 
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Using the fact that 
I
t t p λ  is marginal q, i.e. the market value added to the firm by the 
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t ε  can be thought of as an optimization error. An additive shock to the cost-of-adjustment 
function would also have the same effect. Expression (7’) links the investment rate to 
marginal q adjusted for the relative price of investment goods. Under the assumptions that the 
production function is linearly homogeneous in capital and labour, the cost function is linearly 
homogeneous in capital and investment and output markets are perfectly competitive, Hayashi 
(1982) has shown that marginal q is equal to average Q, i.e. the market value of the firm as a 
ratio of the replacement cost of installed capital, which is observable to the econometrician. 
Hence, equation (7’) can be used to estimate the investment rate of an optimizing firm under 
perfect competition. 
  132.1.2 A dynamic model of investment  
An alternative way to proceed would be to use the fact that 
1
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Equation (8) states that the net revenue generated by the marginal unit of 
capital at time t  should equal the discounted value of marginal expenses for 
investment at time t+1, so that the firm becomes indifferent between investment in 
two adjacent periods. If net revenue from the installation of an additional unit of 
capital at time t exceeded marginal expenses for investment at time t+1, the firm 










 will give the optimal (intertemporally) rate of investment. Given the specific 
functional form of the cost-of-adjustment function this is:
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10 This follows from the fact that 
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we used linear homogeneity of the production function in capital and labour to write 
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, i.e. the marginal product of 
capital is equal to cash-flow as a rate of capital stock. Therefore, under the assumption of a CRS 
production function the ratio of cash-flow to capital stock is equal to the marginal product of capital.   
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where   is again an optimization error.   1 + t u
Here 

















 is the real discount factor, adjusted for 
depreciation ( and  t i t π  stand for nominal interest rate and inflation rate, respectively, 


























. This expression shows that the cost of capital is equal to 
the expectation of the discounted relative price of net investment tomorrow minus the 
relative price of investment goods today. It should be noted that the cost of capital and 
the cash-flow term enter equation (9) with equal and opposite coefficients. Under the 
assumptions made above, this means that the investment rate actually depends 
negatively on the difference between the marginal product of capital at time t and the 
increase in the relative price of investment between periods t and t+1. This term can 
be thought of as capturing the opportunity cost of investment at time t+1. 
2.2 Investment behavior of an optimizing firm with monopoly power 
If the firm has monopoly power in the market for the good it produces, then 
the above conditions have to be altered to take account of the fact that additional units 
of capital will increase the scale of production and the monopoly rent which accrues 




t t t t t t
I
t t t t t t t t t t I p L w Y p I p L w I K C p L K F p R − − = − − − = ) , ( ) , (  
 
where   is net output. If we denote by η the elasticity of demand 
for net output produced by the firm and let 
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  15Since c is a positive scalar lower than one, the coefficient on the marginal q 
term is higher in this case, compared to the perfect competition version of the model, 
indicating a larger responsiveness of investment to the market valuation of the firm, 
when the latter has monopoly power. However, equation (10) cannot be used for the 
estimation of an investment equation under monopoly power. The reason is that the 
equality between marginal q and average Q breaks down. As has been shown by 
Hayashi (1982), average Q in this case equals marginal q plus the monopoly rent. The 
latter can be shown to be equal to the discounted present value of current and future 
sales-to-capital ratios, scaled by c. Simply substituting the market-based average Q for 
marginal  q  would lead then to measurement error. On the other hand, since it is 
difficult to find a proxy for future monopoly rents average Q cannot be accordingly 
adjusted and therefore the Q  model would give downward biased coefficient 
estimates.
12  
Compared to the Q  model, the dynamic model of investment allows for a 
straightforward handling of market power. In a similar way it can be shown that the 
investment specification resulting from the Euler equation can be written in the case 
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In this specification not only the coefficient on cash-flow and on the cost of 
capital is scaled by c but also a positive output term appears in the Euler equation. In 
the case of perfect competition  1 = c  and this term disappears, so that this 
specification collapses back into (9).  
3. Data and empirical evidence 
In this section we make an attempt to explain the investment behaviour of 
British manufacturing firms in the 1970s and the 1980s by estimating both a Q-based 
and a dynamic model of investment, using the analytical framework discussed in the 
previous section.  
                                                 
12 Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) propose a way to circumvent the problem of monopoly power 
in the framework of a Q model. They quasidifference the investment equation, so that the part of the 
sales term which depends on expected future sales disappears. They construct a modified Q including 
this term in the numerator and run a regression of investment on modified Q and sales.  
  16We use panel data for 779 British
13 manufacturing firms quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period 1971-1990. The two databases from which 
the data stem are the EXSTAT
14 database compiled by Extel Financial Limited, 
which contains balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and the London Share 
Price Database to match the firm-level data with stock market information. Some 
general descriptive characteristics of the sample are included in Table 1. The sample 
has been divided into three size groups.
15 In order to construct the size groups, first 
the average (across time) size of a firm is computed on the basis of its in-sample 
information on deflated net assets. Then, the boundaries between the groups are 
defined by the 33rd and the 66th percentile of the average size distribution of firms. 
Observations are more or less equally distributed among size classes with a small bias 
towards the upper size group. In fact more companies are included in the small size 
group, but the average number of records per company increases with company size 
with 12.6 years for small companies, 13.8 years for middle and 16.5 years for large 
companies. 
The descriptive summary of our sample in Table 1, reveals that the average 
size of firms in the upper size group is about 90 times bigger than that in the lower 
group. Also, average sales growth (sales growth is an important determinant of 
investment in accelerator models) as well as average investment rate, defined as the 
ratio of new investment to existing capital stock at the end of the previous period, is 
higher for small firms. Regarding their financial policies, small firms resort more 
heavily than large ones to bank finance. Small firms also appear to rely more on 
retentions than large firms, even paying zero dividends in 16.4% of the available 
sample observations compared to a rather low 4.4% for large firms. This is also 
supported by the fact that the ratio of the total cost of equity dividends to the profits 
available for dividends is higher for large firms. 
It should be noted that normally accounting period practices vary across 
companies and across time. In order for flow data to be comparable these are therefore 
scaled by a factor which equals one for 12-month or 52-week accounting periods and 
is accordingly adjusted for smaller or larger accounting period durations. This 
                                                 
13 A few Irish and Dutch manufacturing firms listed on the LSE are also included, with their balance 
sheet and profit and loss account items being converted into UK pounds using average annual exchange 
rates.  
14 For antother use of the EXSTAT database see Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002). 
15 For a detailed definition of variables, see Appendix. 
  17essentially entails the simplification that flow variables evolve linearly during a year. 
The benefits of this approach seem, however, larger than its potential drawbacks, 
since it allows the use of a much larger number of company data. 
In this paper only investment in property and other tangible assets is 
considered. The replacement cost of such assets might differ significantly from their 
historical cost reported in the balance sheet due to reasons such as depreciation, factor 
price inflation and technological progress. In particular, depreciation and 
technological progress tend to decrease the value of installed capital goods, whereas 
factor price inflation tends to increase it. For the calculation of the replacement cost of 
assets the perpetual inventory formula was used: 
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where  t π  is a deflator, defined below,   denotes replacement cost and   denotes 




Table 1: The profile of the sample 










General characteristics      
Number of companies  289  264  226 
Number of observations  3645  3637  3740 
Average years/company  12.6  13.8  16.5 
Average size  
(deflated net assets)
 
£3,5 million  £13,5 million  £315 million 
Average sales  
growth per year  
19.1% 16.9%  18.1% 
Average  
investment rate 
25.6% 22.8%  19.6% 
Finance      
Bank loans (% of total assets)  40.7%  29.8%  20.4% 
Retained earnings (% of 
available profits) 
67.4% 55.7%  53.3% 
Dividend policy      
Percentage of years with zero 
dividend payouts (gross) 
16.4% 7.6%  4.4% 
Total cost of equity 
dividends/profits available for 
dividends  
30.6% 43.2%  45.1% 
 
This states that the replacement cost of capital at time t is equal to the 
replacement cost of capital at period t-1, appropriately deflated, plus the change in the 
historical cost of capital (i.e. investment) between time t-1 and time t. For the first 
time period it is necessary to assume that the replacement cost of assets equals the 
  18historical cost. Of course, as one moves further away from the base period, this 
assumption carries less weight. Moreover, this assumption allows us to calculate a 
series of replacement costs, which is an improvement compared to using the historical 
cost series. A number of additional assumptions are needed for the calculation of the 
deflator. We assume here that the deflator is given by the formula: 
( )
) 1 (










where   is the gross fixed capital formation deflator, 
F
t π δ  is the depreciation rate, 
assumed to be 2.5% for land and buildings and 8.19% for plant and machinery,
16 and 
θ  is the rate of technological progress. For lack of data, this latter term is ignored and 
time-varying technology shocks are captured by the inclusion of time dummies below. 
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Investment at historical cost Investment at replacement cost
 
 
For the construction of the investment rate series which is used as regressand 
below the difference in total fixed assets (gross of depreciation) between periods t and 
t-1 is divided by the replacement cost of capital at the end of period t-1 (see Chart 1). 
The series of investment divided by capital stock at historical cost is also shown in 
                                                 
16 According to calculations by King and Fullerton (1984) for UK manufacturing. 
  19Chart 1, and it can be seen to be slightly lower than the one at replacement cost (as 
capital stock at replacement cost, i.e. the denominator, is higher), but in general the 
correlation between the two series is very high. 
Since one of the equations to be estimated uses average Q as a regressor, the 
constru
n is required to calculate a firm’s market value. 
In part
                                                
ction of this variable is crucial. It should be noted that the average Q used as a 
regressor in the following section is not tax-adjusted. To calculate a tax adjusted 
series, information on the corporate tax rate, the investment tax credit and the present 
value of depreciation allowances due to past investment must be available. Since the 
capital stock measure used here also does not take account of tax considerations, 
ignoring taxes should not matter for the qualitative comparison between the Q model 
and the Euler equation. However, because of the use of tax-unadjusted Q, the reader 
should be cautioned against a structural interpretation of the parameters in the Q 
estimations in the following section. 
First, stock market informatio
icular the market value of a company is assumed to equal the market value of 
its shares plus the value of its debt. The average market value of the company’s shares 
over a year can be defined as the product of its average share number multiplied by 
the mean transaction price at which the company’s shares were traded during the year. 
Given data limitations, the average number of shares is calculated simply as the mean 
of the number of shares in period t and period t+1 (as a result Q cannot be calculated 
for the last sample period of each company). Average Q is then derived by dividing 
the sum of the market value of the firm plus its debt
17 by the replacement cost of 
existing capital stock at the end of the previous period. We also calculate average Q 
dividing by the historical cost of fixed assets. However, the two alternative measures 
of Q are highly correlated with each other as they are both driven by market trends. 
Both series are presented in Chart 2. Finally, to give an idea of the relationship 
between Q and investment rate at replacement cost, the two series are plotted together 
in Chart 3. 
 
17 The value of a firm’s debt is added to its average market value to take account of the possibility that 
debt can be used as an additional source of finance (beside internal finance and issue of equity). 
  20Chart 2 
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  213.1 Estimation of the Q model 
Once average Q has been constructed the estimation of a Q model of 
investment should be quite straight-forward. However, as already mentioned, a 
number of issues arise regarding the correct estimation procedure to be applied. 
Before describing the estimation procedures used here, it should be noted that in what 
follows the absence of market power for firms is assumed, as in its presence the 
equality between average Q and marginal q would break down. 




















 is the investment rate for firm i at time t (i.e. investment as a ratio of installed capital) 
and the only explanatory variable is  , which represents the market value of the firm as a 
per cent of installed capital. The structure of the error term is of special interest, as it will 
determine the appropriateness of alternative estimation procedures. It allows for both an 
individual effect (which could reflect e.g. management abilities or other firm-specific 
characteristics) and a time effect, which is essential to capture the missing effect of changing 
relative prices (investment prices and prices in the goods market), common to all firms over 
time, as well as cyclical variation in investment. Obviously the individual effects 
it Q
i μ  should 
be allowed to be correlated with the firm’s stock market valuation  ,  i.e.  it Q 0 ) ( ≠ i it Q E μ , 
and hence a fixed-effects estimator should be preferable to a random effects one, as it would 
deliver unbiased and consistent results. The transitory part of the error term it ε  is assumed to 
be iid with mean zero and a constant variance. An additional assumption is made that Q is 
independent of the time effects. This assumption will be relaxed later on. 
Under the assumptions made above it is possible to treat the fixed time-effects 
as dummies whose coefficients can be estimated. This would be equivalent to an one-
way error component model. Since there are only 19 time dummies it is 
computationally feasible to apply this procedure. Simply estimating the model in the 
form of deviations from time averages wipes out the individual effects and delivers a 
  22consistent
18 estimator. In this case, the Within estimator of β is given by simply 
running OLS on the transformed model  
) ( ) ( . .
.
i it t i it
i it
















⎛ λ β .
19  
The within estimator of β is given in column (1) of Table 2. Only companies 
for which at least five years of observations on Q  are available are used. The 
coefficient on Q is statistically significant and positive. The joint significance of the 
individual effects as well as the joint significance of the time dummies is not rejected 
at a 5% significance level. The constant is positive but not significant. The ρ 
coefficient which shows the fraction of variance in the dependent variable due to the 
individual effects is estimated to be 11.4%.  
For the sake of comparison, the results of a random effects GLS estimation of the 
model in column (1) are reported in column (2). As can be seen the point estimate for 
β decreases marginally compared to the estimate in the first column, while the point 
estimate for the constant increases but remains statistically insignificant. To choose 
between random and fixed effects a Hausman (1978) specification test is performed. 
Under the null of no correlation between the individual effects and the regressor both 
random and fixed effects provide unbiased and consistent estimators.
20  I f  t h e  
alternative hypothesis is true the fixed effects estimator remains consistent and 
unbiased while the random effects estimator does not. The Hausman test in which the 
coefficients on Q as well as on the time dummies are tested rejects the null hypothesis 
(the test statistic which is distributed as a   is 45.20  with a probability of 
exceeding the tabulated value equal to zero). Consequently the fixed effects 
estimation of column (1) should be preferred. This result confirms the intuition that 
the estimation of a fixed-effects model rather than a random effects one makes more 
sense, since in this application a particular sample of firms (which was not drawn 
randomly, but satisfies certain criteria) is used in order to draw inference on their  
investment behaviour. It is also perfectly reasonable that the individual effects will be 
) 19 (
2 χ
                                                 
18 Asymptotic properties of estimators refer to an increasing N, holding the time dimension constant. Of 
course the fixed-effects estimator of the individual effects will not be consistent, as the number of  i μ ’s 
increases as N tends to infinity. 
19 It is assumed that ∑ =
t
t 0 λ , to avoid multicollinearity given the fact that a constant is included in 
the original model. 
20 Consistency of the fixed effects estimator relies on the assumption made above that there is no 
correlation between the time effects and the regressor. 
  23correlated with our measure of investment opportunities, Q, since for example market 
valuation of a firm could partly reflect management choices and abilities. 
 
Table 2: Estimation of the Q-specification 
Regression of  I/K on:  Fixed effects 
(time dummies) 
(1) 




(Baltagi method)  
(3) 












2 0.0664 0.0678  0.0497 
Within  0.0606 0.0597   
Between  0.1416 0.1661   
Test for joint significance of 
individual effects 




Test for joint significance of 
time effects
 
F( 19,  8750) =4.58 







ρ  0.11358802 0.02142471   









2 = 0.0010 
 
 
    
Number of observations: 9549 
Number of firms: 779 
Number of obs. per firm: min.: 5, average: 12.3, maximum: 19 
  * Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
The assumption made above of no correlation between the fixed time effects 
and the regressor is quite stringent, since roughly translated it would mean that 
„good“ or „bad“ news from the stock exchange cannot be reflected in the cyclical 
variability of investment. If this assumption is relaxed the fixed effects estimator with 
the inclusion of time dummies will no longer be consistent. In this case Baltagi (1995) 
shows that the Within estimator of β, derived by running OLS on the transformed 





























































Q Q Q Q Q t i it it + − − =  and  .. . .
~ u u u u u t i it it + − − =   
 
. i X  denotes for each individual the average across time of variable  ,  it X t X .  
denotes for each time period the average across individuals of variable   and  it X .. X  
denotes the average of variable   across time and individuals. By wiping out the  it X
  24individual and the time effects this transformation eliminates correlation between the 
regressor and the error term and hence the derived estimator will be consistent and 
unbiased.  
The results from this estimation are reported in column (3) of Table 2.
21 The 
coefficient on Q  is again statistically significant and slightly higher than in the 
previous two estimations. The 
2 R  is at around 5%. Using the procedure outlined in 
Baltagi (1995) the joint significance hypotheses of individual effects and of time 
effects are tested. The resulting F-statistics are sufficiently large to reject both the 
hypothesis of individual effects being jointly equal to zero and the hypothesis of time 
effects being equal to zero at a 1% significance level. 
Given the fact that under the null of independence between Q and the time 
effects both the Baltagi Within estimator and the fixed-effects with time dummies 
give consistent estimates of β, but under the alternative hypothesis only the Baltagi 
estimator is consistent, a Hausman (1978) specification test can be ran to compare the 
two estimators. The resulting test statistic, distributed as Χ
2(1) is well above the 5% 
critical value (3.841), and therefore the null of independence between Q and the time 
effects can be rejected at any statistically  meaningful level. 
One point which deserves further investigation relates to the possibility of 
endogeneity of Q. One possible reason for endogeneity could be the fact that the 
individual effects or the time effects are correlated with Q. In this case, as has been 
shown by Mundlak (1978), the fixed effects Within transformation appearing in 
column (3) delivers a consistent BLUE estimator for β. A more interesting case comes 
up if Q is correlated with the transitory part of the error term. In fact the assumptions 
made about the timing of the investment decision imply that Q contains information 
not only for future but also for current profitability and might therefore be correlated 
with  it ε  (the part of the error term which is neither individual-specific nor time-
specific). If  it ε  is thought of as representing a shock to the cost-of-adjustment 
function, then it will immediately affect the investment rate, but it will also increase 
Q, by increasing the future profitability of investment (it will increase the term 
                                                 
21 Software-reported standard errors in column (3) are corrected by the term (n-K)/(n-N-T-K+1), to take 







∂ + ) ( 1  in equation (5’)). Therefore an estimation procedure which takes 
account of possible correlation between Q and  it ε  should be used.  
A further point usually made in the empirical literature on Q  models of 
investment is that the observed Q might be measured with error. In this case an OLS 
procedure would deliver biased and inconsistent results. The usual fixed effects 
estimators, e.g. the Within or the First Difference estimator, would be biased 
downwards. Moreover the regression of investment on Q  would have a low R
2. 
Griliches and Hausman (1986) show that estimating difference models of different 
„lengths“ and using appropriate lags or leads of the regressor (or linear combinations 
thereof) as instruments one could actually get an estimate of the measurement bias. 
In an attempt to identify and remedy the two potential problems of 
measurement error and of endogeneity of Q we first estimate the model in first and 
second differences. According to Griliches and Hausman (1986) the attenuation bias 
in case of measurement error will be higher in the presence of serial correlation in the 
true unobserved variable. Since the correlation should be higher the shorter the time 
length between two observations, there should be less of a downward bias in a 
difference model of higher order. The results are reported in Table 3. It is quite 
surprising that the coefficient in the second difference model is lower than the one in 
the first difference model. A simple t-test of the hypothesis that the two estimates are 
equal is rejected (t=104.5, p>| t |=0.00). This is an indication of the presence of 
measurement bias and hence an IV estimation with appropriate lags of the regressor 
used as instruments should be applied.  
An obvious instrument which can be used is the first lag of Q. If however Q is 
endogenous,  εit-1 will be correlated with Qit-Qit-1 in a first difference IV estimation. 
Therefore only lags of Q dated t-2 or older can be valid instruments. If in addition we 
assume that the transitory part of the composite error term is not serially correlated 
then in a model which wipes out individual effects (e.g. Within or First Difference 
transformation) the transformed error term will not be correlated with the regressor.
22 
In column (3) results are reported for an instrumental variables estimation, with lags 
                                                 
22 It is a bit more complicated in the presence of measurement error, in which case as shown by 
Griliches and Hausman (1986), the stochastic properties of the measurement error will determine the 
set of valid instruments. In some extreme cases, where the measurement error is serially correlated but 
with no obvious structure, the use of external instruments becomes necessary. 
  26of Q dated t-2… t-5 as well as the time dummies used as instruments. The point 
estimate of β almost triples, compared to the estimates in Table 2, and remains 
statistically significant. The R
2 also increases to more satisfactory levels. The 
statistical significance of the lags of Q in the first stage estimation (regression of Q on 
the set of instruments) indicates their validity as instruments.  
 
Table 3: Estimation of the Q-specification 
















(Instruments:  Qt-2…Qt-5 











2 0.0534 0.0542  0.1857 
Within     0.2296 
Between     0.1640 









ρ     0.171342 
Characteristics 
of the sample 
Number of 
observations: 8753 




Number of firms: 779 
 
Number of observations: 
5616 
Number of firms: 717 
 
  * Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 1 The first difference IV estimation method is used. 
 
More distant lags can also be used as instruments, although the “older” the 
information the less it should add to the model. The IV estimation results indicate 
that, if something, the benchmark specifications (fixed effects with time dummies and 
within estimator) reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, underestimate the effect 
of  Q  on the optimal investment rate chosen by the firm. Comparing the results 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 to the results of various Q model specifications found in  
the empirical literature, the statistical significance of Q is confirmed, although in the 
estimations reported here, the economic importance of Q  as captured by the 






  27Table 4: Coefficients on Q in the empirical literature* 
References Coefficient  on  Q  Sample Other  regressors 
Hayashi and Inoue 
(1991) 
0.027-0.032 687  Japanese  firms 
(1962-86) 
-- 
Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991) 
0.006 337  Japanese  firms 
(1977-82) 
CF 
Chirinko and Schaller 
(1995) 
0.0005 212  Canadian  firms 
(1973-86) 
-- 
Erickson and Whited 
(2000) 
0.014-0.045  737 US firms (1992-
95) 
-- 
Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) 
0.0044-0.0073  422 US firms (1970-
84) 
-- 
Blundell et al. (1992)  0.0092-0.0099  532 UK firms (1975-
86) 
-- 




188 US firms (1951-
85) 
-- 
* The purpose of this table is to provide an indicative range of estimates in the literature, not an 
exhaustive account. 
3.2 Estimation of the Euler equation 
In contrast to the Q-type investment models, the Euler equation specification 
as given in equations (9) and (11) allows for a distinction to be made between the case 
of perfect and imperfect competition in the output market. By considering  1 + t ϕ , i.e. 
the real discount factor, constant across two adjacent periods one can estimate for the 
case of perfect competition an investment model from equation (9), allowing for fixed 
time dummies to capture the common effect for all firms of changing cost of capital 
and possible cyclical variation in the investment rate over time.  
The investment rate is defined as before, i.e. investment in fixed assets as a 
percentage of existing capital stock at replacement cost at the end of the previous 
period. The equation to be estimated includes as regressors the lag of the investment 
rate, the square of the lagged investment rate and the lag of cash-flow. Cash-flow is 
constructed from the EXSTAT profit and loss accounts data, as profits minus tax 
minus interest expenses divided again by the replacement cost of capital stock at the 
end of period t-1. 
Since equation (9) includes the lagged dependent variable as a regressor an 
OLS estimation would give biased and inconsistent estimators and therefore an 
alternative estimation methodology should be applied. Arellano and Bond (1991) 





it j j it it W X y y ε μ γ β δ + + + + = ∑ ∑ − , , 1       ( 1 3 )  
  28where the  ’s are exogenous covariates and the  ’s are predetermined variables. By first 
differencing they wipe out the individual effects and transform the above model to one which 
can be estimated by GMM, exploiting the orthogonality conditions between lagged values of 
the dependent variable and the transformed error term. In particular, the model in first 
differences becomes: 
j X k W
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 , , 1 , , 2 1 1 − − − − − − − + − + − + − = − ∑ ∑ it it
k
it k it k k
j
it j it j j it it it it W W X X y y y y ε ε γ β δ       (14) 
Now  can be used as an instrument in a GMM estimation of (14) since it is 
correlated with  , but it is orthogonal to the transformed error term 
2 − it y
) ( 2 1 − − − it it y y
) ( 1 − − it it ε ε , as long as  it ε  is serially uncorrelated. If  it ε  is MA(q) then all lags of the 
dependent variable dated (t-q-2) and older can be used as instruments. In addition to 
that, the Arellano and Bond estimation procedure uses a maximum of (t-p-1) lags
23 of 
the predetermined variables and differences of the exogenous variables as 
instruments. Hence a sufficiently large set of instruments is included and the estimates 
of the parameters in (14) should be consistent. 
In our estimation, the time dummies are treated as exogenous covariates, the 
square of lagged investment is treated as endogenous and the lag of cash-flow is 
treated as predetermined. Results for the one-step Arellano-Bond estimation are 
reported in column (1) of Table 5. The one-step estimation is more suitable for 
inference, especially in the presence of weak instruments. This is particularly so, since 
estimated standard errors of the two-step estimators have been found to be downward 
biased in Monte Carlo studies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
From the coefficient estimates reported in column (1) of Table 5 only lagged 
investment and its square are statistically significant. Although both bear the correct 
signs, they are numerically far from the values consistent with the theory (around 1 
for lagged investment and 0.5 for its square). The coefficient of lagged cash-flow, is 
as expected negative, but statistically insignificant. The Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals of order (1) and (2) is rejected at the 5% significance 
level. Finally, the Sargan’s test statistic for overidentifying restrictions is rejected, 
suggesting invalidity of some of the instruments used. Further attempts to modify the 
                                                 
23 Where p is the number of lags of the predetermined variable appearing in the model. 
  29instrument set by specifying a maximum number of lags of the dependent and other 
variables to be used as instruments did not improve the results.  
Column (2) reports results on the Euler equation for investment for the case of 
imperfect competition in the output market. With the exception of lagged investment 
which has now a negative effect, all coefficients bear the correct signs, but are 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation of the Euler equation for investment 







































































residuals of order 1 
z =  -1.94    
Pr > z = 0.0520 
z =  -3.01    
Pr > z = 0.0026 
Test for 
autocorrelation in 
residuals of order 2 
z =   0.26    
Pr > z = 0.7986 
 
z =  -0.48    
Pr > z = 0.6277 
 














Nr of obs: 8756 
Nr of firms: 779 
Avg obs per firm: 
11.2 
Nr of obs: 8753 
Nr of firms: 779 
Avg obs per firm: 
11.2 
 
a Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
 
statistically insignificant. Autocorrelation of order (1) is detected in the residuals, 
while the Sargan test statistic rejects the validity of the instruments used. All this 
suggests a very poor fit of the Euler equation to the available data set, especially in the 
case of imperfect competition. 
  303.3 Robustness analysis 
Although the results in the previous sections on the Q model as well as on the 
Euler equation would allow for a first qualitative conclusion on the relative 
performance of the two alternative empirical models, a more conclusive statement can 
only be formulated after a robustness analysis has been performed. Three different 
robustness tests are performed in the following sub-sections. In the first, the sample is 
restricted to firms with more than 10 observations, while the next two are based on 
alternative sample splits suggested in the literature to test for the validity of the 
neoclassical assumptions. This is usually done by adding variables like cash-flows or 
output in a Q model (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen; 1988) or a debt term and 
a dividend term in Euler equations (see e.g. Bond and Meghir; 1994) and estimating 
for different sample splits. However, since the object of this paper is to test 
empirically the two different theoretical models, no extra variables are added. If 
financial constraints play a role for investment this should lead to lower explanatory 
power and lower coefficients for the group of firms which is identified as financially 
constrained. 
A caveat of this methodology is that firms are a priori classified as being 
likely to face financial constraints which invalidate the neoclassical assumptions on 
the basis of some of their characteristics which could reveal problems in the 
communication of information. This does not allow the study of the longitudinal 
dimension of financial constraints, e.g. it does not take account of the fact that a firm 
which is financially constrained today, might not be tomorrow and vice versa. Despite 
this shortcoming, this methodology has proved useful for the study of financial 
constraints and it is applied in the following sub-sections.  
3.3.1 Firms with more than 10 observations  
The original results have been reported for firms with at least 5 observations in 
the sample. This number of sample periods is large enough to bring out the time 
dimension of the panel data, but it is also quite unrestrictive since firms with relatively 
few in-sample observations are included. By now constraining our estimation to firms 
with more than 10 records we pick up firms with a longer track record, for which the 
neoclassical assumptions are more likely to hold: the longer the track record of a 
company the less information problems it would face and the less financially 
  31constrained it should therefore be. For example because the evaluation of young firms 
by financial institutions is more costly.
24
Of course it is not necessarily true that the track record based on the 
observations of this sample reflects the track record of a certain company in the 
market. In fact, the lack of more observations for these particular firms might indicate 
either that they were “born” after 1970, or that they “died” before 1990, or even that 
they were not listed for some part of the 1970-1990 period. In the former case, these 
are young and non-established firms which according to the existing literature are 
more likely to face information-related financial constraints, so that the neoclassical 
assumptions are less likely to hold for them. Also in the last case, the fact that the 
firms were for some reason not listed for a large part of the sample period makes them 
more vulnerable to financial constraints, since being listed on the stock exchange 
mitigates partly information asymmetries because it increases transparency of a firm’s 
financial accounts. Finally, a firm which has less than 5 in-sample observations 
because it “died” before 1990, must have either been “born” after the sample start (so 
it falls to the category of “young”) or must have not been listed for some part of the 
sample before it actually “died” (in which case the argument of higher information 
asymmetries facing non-listed firms applies). Hence, although the number of in-
sample observations cannot be used as a proxy for firm’s age, it can however be used 
as a criterion for information-related asymmetries and, consequently, it can be used 
for testing the validity of the neoclassical assumptions. 
The firms included in this second estimation are now much less (527 compared to 779 
before), while the mean sample size becomes slightly larger (£115 million compared 
to £112 million before). Table 6 reports the results for Q specification estimations for 
firms with more than 10 observations. The results are qualitatively virtually 
unchanged, but coefficients on Q are now higher for all types of estimation (t-test for 
the difference of the coefficients estimated with the fixed effects with time dummies 
on the whole and the restricted sample is 2,200, Prob > | t | = 0.0000) and the 
explanatory power of the various specifications as captured by R-squared has also 
markedly increased. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Hausman test clearly 
rejects both the hypothesis that estimates from the fixed and the random effects model 
                                                 
24 As Deputy Governor McMahon of the Bank of England put it: “…the long-term institutions find it 
unrewarding to spend time assessing new or small firms as credit risks, preferring instead to channel 
large blocks of funds into well-recognised companies” [QB, vol. 21, issue 1, p. 73]. 
  32are not systematically different and the hypothesis that estimates from the two fixed 
effects models (one based on the Baltagi method and the other on the inclusion of 
time dummies) are not systematically different. This allows us to conclude that our 
choice of a fixed effects estimation is appropriate and that among the two fixed effects 
estimations the Baltagi method should be preferred. The results generally show that 
the  Q  model is robust to the length of the track record for our sample of firms. 
Moreover, it suggests that the longer the track record the higher the probability that 
the assumptions of the neoclassical model apply for the firms under consideration.  
 
                                        Table 6: Estimation of the Q-specification 












Random effects  





(Instruments: second lag 
of Q and time dummies) 
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2 0.1308 0.1357  0.1359  0.2039 
Within   0.1407  0.1405  0.2307 
Between   0.1463  0.1489  0.2142 





F(526, 7305)=  1.13     
Prob > F = 0.0246 
F(526, 7305)=  1.18    
Prob > F = 0.0045 
--  





Prob > F =  0.1367 
 
F( 19,  7305) =  2.00 
Prob > F =    0.0061 
chi2( 19) =   36.71 
Prob > chi2 =0.0086 
 
ρ   0.08128004  0.00378242  0.15862991 
Hausman test  chi
2(1)=89.91 
Prob > chi
2 =  0.0000 
  
Hausman test    chi2(20) =       86.59 
    Prob>chi




s of the 
sample 
Nr. of obs.: 7852 
Nr. of firms: 527 
Avg. obs. per firm: 14.9 
Nr. of obs.: 5182 
Nr. of firms: 527 
Avg. obs. per firm: 9.8 
  * Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
In Table 7 results for the Euler equation for the restricted sample are reported. 
The results do not show a marked improvement like in the case of the Q model. Now 
in the case of perfect competition the coefficient of lagged investment becomes 
statistically insignificant but the coefficient on lagged cash-flow is statistically 
significant and bears the correct (negative) sign. There is an improvement for the 
estimation in the case of imperfect competition. Although lagged investment has a 
negative and statistically insignificant coefficient, the rest of the coefficients have the 
correct signs and lagged cash-flow and output are statistically significant. It appears 
  33that the imperfect competition version provides a better description for investment 
behaviour in the case of firms with a longer track record. The Sargan test statistic still 
rejects the validity of the instruments used for both versions of the market structure. In 
general however, the results imply that even restricting the sample to firms with more 
in-sample information does not change the fact that the investment model based on 
the Euler equation appears to be problematic.  
 
Table 7: Estimation of the Euler equation for investment 
Regression of  I/K on:  Arellano-Bond  
one-step GMM
 a: 
































































Test for autocorrelation in 
residuals of order 1 
z =  -1.60    
Pr > z = 0.1086 
z =  -3.74    
Pr > z = 0.0002 
Test for autocorrelation in 
residuals of order 2 
z =  -0.24    
Pr > z = 0.8133 
z =  -1.48    
Pr > z = 0.1384 
Sargan’s test statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions 
chi2(545) = 1613.76    
Prob > chi2=0.0000 
 
chi2(733)=  4346.73     
Prob >chi2 =0.0000 
 
Characteristics of the 
sample 
Nr of obs: 7592 
Nr of firms: 527 
Avg obs per firm: 
13.8 
Nr of obs: 7289 
Nr of firms: 527 
Avg obs per firm: 
13.8 
 
a Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
3.3.2 Large vs. small firms 
In the investment literature the point is frequently made that large firms face 
potentially less information problems (because size is often associated with the age 
and the market power of a firm or just because a large firm can draw on a relatively 
bigger collateral pool) and hence the assumptions of the neoclassical model would be 
more likely to hold for them than for small (and maybe young, less established, etc.) 
firms. In particular this means for the Q model that a given increase in Q will increase 
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the desired capital stock and therefore the optimal investment rate for all firms, 
however large firms, which face less financial constraints will be able to actually 
invest more, while small firms lacking internal sources of finance might not be able to 
match the increase in desired capital stock with an increase in realised investment.
25 
Similarly in the dynamic model of investment, an increase in desired capital stock in 
period t, will translate in higher observed investment rates for large than for small 
firms (sensitivity of investment to its determinants should be higher for the former 
than for the latter). If this is indeed the case both our specifications should fit better 
for large than for small firms. This finding would also suggest that a bad fit of our two 
alternative specifications might be attributable to information problems and, 
consequently, to financial constraints. 
As described in Section 2, we divide firms into three categories, characterized 
as small, medium and large. The limits between the three categories are the 33rd and 
the 66th percentile of the average (across time) size distribution of firms in our 
sample. We report only results for small and large firms, i.e. for the two tails of the 
size distribution, to make differences based on the size of the firms more clear.
26
The results for three types of Q specifications (the Within estimator for the 
two-way error component model, the fixed effects estimator with time dummies and 
the IV first difference estimation with Qt-2...Qt-5  and the time dummies used as 
instruments) are reported in Table 8 for small and large firms. It is obvious from the 
results that the explanatory power of the Q model is much higher for large firms than 
for small. Furthermore, in all estimations the coefficients on Q are much higher for 
large firms than for small, even compared to the whole sample estimation reported in 
Table 2.  
 
25 In the March 1981 Budget measures were announced to encourage the provision of finance also to 
small firms. “…there are signs that some financial institutions are expanding their business in this 
area. The clearing banks now operate or participate in schemes to provide medium-term and long-term 
finance and even equity capital, to small firms” [Lecture by the Bank of England Deputy Governor 
McMahon, QB, vol. 21, issue 1, p. 73]. 
26 An alternative approach, in which a dummy for size is interacted with Q, gives almost identical 






(Instruments: Qt-2 … Qt-5 and time 
dummies) 
 
































2 0.1078 0.2483 0.1446  0.3268  0.2662  0.2835 
Within    0.1391  0.3175  0.3097  0.2184 
Between    0.2527  0.5259  0.1471  0.5376 





Prob > F = 0.9635 
F(225, 3003) =2.92   
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
F(288, 2825) =    0.98   
Prob > F = 0.5893 
F(225, 3003) =    2.98   
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
  





Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(19,  3003) = 9.56 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
F( 18,  2825) =    5.07 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
F( 19,  3003) =    5.43 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
  
ρ    0.10368864  0.24567706  0.14741088  0.26319192 
Characteristics of 
the sample 
Number of obs:   
3133 
Number of groups: 
289 
Avg. obs. per 
group: 10.8 
Number of obs:   
3256 
Number of groups: 
231 
Avg. obs. per 
group: 14.1 
Number of obs:   
3133 
Number of groups: 
289 
Avg. obs. per group: 
10.8 
Number of obs:   
3249 
Number of groups: 
226 






Avg. obs. per 
group: 6.5 




Avg. obs. per 
group: 9.8 
Table 8: Estimation of the Q-specification – large vs. small firms 
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* Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
 
 In Table 9 results for the Euler equation of investment are reported for both 
perfect and imperfect competition and for the small and large size groups. The results 
allow us to draw some general conclusions. First, irrespective of the assumptions 
made regarding the structure of the product market, the Euler equation for investment 
appears to be a very poor description of the investment behaviour of small firms. In 
the case of both perfect and imperfect competition, only lagged cash-flow has a 
statistically significant coefficient. The Sargan test statistic in both cases suggests 
invalidity of the instruments used, while autocorrelation of the residuals of order 1 is 
not rejected.  
 
Table 9: Estimation of the Euler equation for investment-large vs. small firms 
  Perfect competition  Imperfect competition 





























































































in residuals of 
order 1 
z =  -4.10    
Pr > z = 0.0000 
z =  -1.29    
Pr > z = 0.1958 
z =  -4.17    
Pr > z = 0.0000 
z =  -1.90    
Pr > z = 0.0570 
Test for 
autocorrelation 
in residuals of 
order 2 
z =  -1.12    
Pr > z = 0.2625 
 
z =  -1.44    
Pr > z = 0.1501 
z =  -1.47    
Pr > z = 0.1425 
z =  -1.41    






chi2(492) =   
598.77     Prob 
>chi2 =0.0007 
chi2(492)=  
1590.15     Prob 
>chi2 =0.0000 
chi2(662) = 
1090.20     Prob > 
chi2=0.0000 
chi2(662) = 2730.02    
Prob > chi2=0.0000 
 
Characteristics 
of the sample 
Nr of obs: 2846 
Nr of firms: 290 
Avg obs per firm: 
9.8 
Nr of obs: 3001 
Nr of firms: 231 
Avg obs per firm: 
13 
Nr of obs: 2843 
Nr of firms: 290 
Avg obs per firm: 
9.8 
Nr of obs: 3001 
Nr of firms: 231 
Avg obs per firm: 13 
  * Significant at a 5% significance level. 
  ** Significant at a 10% significance level. 
 
a Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
  37The picture becomes more puzzling however, when considering the results for 
large firms. In the perfect competition version all coefficients apart from the one on 
the cash-flow term are insignificant. It is rather difficult to interpret the finding that 
the coefficient on lagged cash-flow appears to be positive and not only statistically 
significant but also of great economic importance for the determination of the 
investment behaviour of large firms. In the Euler equation set-up cash-flow represents 
marginal revenue expected from new capital, so that the higher the cash-flow in 
period t-1 the less the firm should invest in period t (a reallocation of investment 
expenditure should occur towards period t-1, where it is more profitable). This finding 
could be explained by the presence of financial constraints, but again using size as a 
proxy for possible information asymmetries, cash-flow should be important for small 
firms, but not (or at least less) important for large firms.  
In the case of imperfect competition the coefficient of lagged investment is 
statistically significant but negative. The cash-flow coefficient still bears the wrong 
sign, but becomes now statistically insignificant. Finally the output term bears the 
correct sign and appears to be statistically and economically significant. Hence for 
large firms imperfect competition appears to be the most likely case but coefficients 
on the other variables included in the Euler equation are either statistically 
insignificant or bear the wrong sign or both. 
3.3.3 Firm dividend policy 
Finally it has been argued in the literature that the dividend policy of a firm 
can be used to identify possible financial constraints that it faces. If there are no 
financial constraints the firm faces a horizontal supply of finance, i.e. it can raise an 
infinite amount of funds at a given price to finance profitable investment projects. 
However, information asymmetries can cause financial constraints to bind for the 
firm. In this case the firm will use up its internal finance (which is priced at a constant 
rate) and then it will have to resort to external finance whose price is increasing in the 
amount of funds raised. This behaviour implies a financial „pecking order“. A part of 
the empirical literature on investment identifies financial constraints from the 
dividend policy of the firm. For example, a firm which cuts its dividends or which 
pays zero dividends for more than one consecutive period is likely to face some 
financial constraints which force it to use all available internal finance before 
resorting to the more costly external finance for the realisation of its investment 
  38projects. In this case, if the cost of external finance is too high some projects which 
would be considered profitable in the absence of financial constraints will not be 
materialised. 
For the division of the sample into financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms (actually firms which are more or less likely to be financially constrained), the 
average across time dividend (as per cent of available profits) of each firm is 
computed and the firms are divided into three groups: low, medium and high dividend 
paying firms. The boundaries between the three groups are the 33rd and the 66th 
percentile of the dividend distribution. The rationale behind this sample division is 
simple. Firms paying high dividends have a sufficient cushion for absorbing shocks in 
the availability of internal finance in the presence of profitable investment projects. A 
firm which pays high dividends can cut down on its dividend payments to finance its 
investment and therefore it is less likely to be financially constrained. In the contrary, 
low dividend paying firms do not have this cushion and in the absence of internal 
finance they might be forced to forego profitable investment opportunities. In Table 9 
the regression results of the Q model for the lowest and highest dividend paying group 
of firms are reported. 
 
 
Table 10: Estimation of the Q-specification – dividend policy 




(Instruments: Qt-2 …Qt-5 and time dummies) 
 






















2 0.0614 0.0378 0.0911 0.2198 
Within    0.1505  0.2519 
Between    0.0371  0.2066 





F(279,2823)=1.54    
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(256,3006) =0.86   
Prob > F = 0.9427 
  





Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(19,3006) =  1.04 
Prob > F =  0.4097 
  
ρ    0.44426317  0.21423017 
Characteristics 
of the sample 
Nr. of obs.: 2846 
Nr. of firms: 280 
Avg. obs. per 
firm: 10.2 
Nr. of obs.: 3283 
Nr. of firms: 257 
Avg. obs. per 
firm: 12.8 
Nr. of obs.: 1711 
Nr. of firms: 252 
Avg. obs. per 
firm: 6.8 
Nr. of obs.: 1984 
Nr. of firms: 240 
Avg. obs. per firm: 8.3 
* Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
  39The results in Table 10 are surprising given what would be expected according 
to the theory. The fixed effects with time dummies method gives a higher coefficient 
estimate for Q, but a lower R
2 for unconstrained firms. On the other hand the IV 
estimation with Qt-2 ... Qt-5 and the time dummies used as instruments results in a 
much higher coefficient for constrained firms, but a lower coefficient of 
determination.  
One possible explanation for this puzzling result is that the dividend policy of 
a firm might not only reflect the availability of financial resources. It is possible that 
taking into account free cash-flow considerations shareholders “enforce” a high 
dividend policy to limit cash-flow available to managers, i.e. as a way of internal 
monitoring. In this case for high-dividend paying firms average Q as measured by the 
market is higher than average Q as observed by firm management, the latter being 
important for the determination of firm investment. Measurement error will differ 
between the constrained and the unconstrained group.  
Another possible explanation is that the dividend payout ratio is determined 
endogenously, i.e. firms facing a positive shock in the cost-of-adjustment function 
will reduce dividend payments to finance profitable investment, while firms which 
face negative adjustment shocks will be able to increase dividend payments, since 
investment will not be equally profitable for them. In this case firms with good 
investment opportunities would fall into the category of constrained, while firms with 
actually worse investment opportunities will be identified as unconstrained based on 
their dividend payments. This could explain the higher coefficient in the case of 
unconstrained firms (Blinder, 1988). However, this explanation is less plausible given 
the fact that the dividend-based classification of firms is applied by averaging 
dividend-payments over a longer period of time.  
Similarly, Table 11 reports results for the two parts of the sample based on the 
Euler equation for investment. Once more it becomes obvious that an attempt to 
identify financially constrained firms and allow them to have a different investment 
behaviour, changes the results of the Euler equation for investment in a rather 
unexpected way, compared to the baseline estimations. For constrained firms, in the 
case of perfect competition, coefficients on lagged investment and its square are 
statistically significant and bear the correct sign, while lagged cash-flow is 
statistically insignificant and has a positive sign. In the case of imperfect competition 
  40only the square of lagged investment is statistically significant, while the coefficient 
on output is insignificant.  
 
Table 11: Estimation of the Euler equation for investment-dividend policy 
  Perfect competition  Imperfect competition 





























































































in residuals of 
order 1 
z =  -2.41    
Pr > z = 0.0158 
z =  -1.33    
Pr > z = 0.1844 
z =  -2.33    
Pr > z = 0.0199 
z =  -3.10    
Pr > z = 0.0019 
Test for 
autocorrelation 
in residuals of 
order 2 
z =  -2.02    
Pr > z = 0.0436 
z =   0.25    
Pr > z = 0.8029 
 
z =  -2.30    
Pr > z = 0.0216 
 
z =   1.48    
Pr > z = 0.1380 
Sargan’s test 
statistic for  
chi2(545) =  
669.11     Prob > 
chi2 =0.0002 
 
chi2(492) =  1343.12   
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
chi2(733) =  
993.87     Prob 
>chi2 =0.0000 
chi2(662) =  2367.60   
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
  No of obs.: 2856 
No of firms: 280 
Avg. obs. per 
firm: 10.2 
No of obs.: 3022 
No of firms: 257 
Avg. obs. per firm: 
11.8 
No of obs.: 2843 
No of firms: 280 
Avg. obs. per 
firm: 10.2 
No of obs.: 3022 
No of firms: 257 
Avg. obs. per firm: 
11.8 
  * Significant at a 5% significance level. 
  ** Significant at a 10% significance level. 
 
a Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
For unconstrained firms, in the case of perfect competition no coefficient 
appears to be significant. Only in the case of imperfect competition the coefficient on 
lagged cash-flow is statistically and economically significant and bears the correct 
sign. However, the insignificance of the lagged output term, suggests that imperfect 
competition should not be the preferred version for unconstrained firms.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper made a comparison of the empirical fit of Euler equations for 
investment and of Q-type models of investment, based on a sample of British quoted 
  41manufacturing firms. Keeping in mind general criticism of the two approaches, e.g. 
the fact that Q models can only be estimated for stock market listed firms or that 
marginal q is an unobservable variable and has to be aproximated by a constructed 
variable which may entail significant measurement error, the empirical results imply a 
relative superiority of the Q model. This of course only in the sense that estimations 
deliver results consistent with theory, and the model specifications are not rejected. 
The fact remains that in the whole sample estimations Q appears to have a quite low 
explanatory power for investment and the estimated coefficients on Q  are small, 
suggesting the presence of unreasonably high adjustment costs.  
Some additional interesting conclusions can be drawn from the robustness 
analysis. Although this type of a priori classification of firms to test for the validity of 
the neoclassical assumptions has been often criticized, however, in the case of the Q 
model it has been possible to show that this specification provides a better description 
of reality for firms which have a long track record and large firms, while it has been a 
very (or relatively) poor description of investment behaviour for firms with short track 
records and small firms. This could be attributed to financial constraints which are 
more likely to bind for firms displaying the latter characteristics. An attempt to 
classify firms on the basis of their dividend policies failed to deliver the expected 
results, indicating that dividend policy does not provide the necessary information 
content to reveal possible financial constraints.  
Regarding the Euler investment model, the results have been quite 
disappointing. In the baseline model, all variables had the correct signs as predicted 
by the theory, however only lagged investment and its square appeared to be 
statistically significant. The perfect competition version appeared to be more 
appropriate for the whole sample estimation. However, the robustness analysis proved 
that the coefficient estimates are extremely instable across different sample splits and 
so is the inference on the statistical significance of various determinants of 
investment.  
Given the fact that both models have a common framework as a starting point, 
the overall conclusion is that there is not enough evidence against the general 
neoclassical framework, however both models (one more than the other) fail to give 
an adequate explanation for variability in investment.  
  42APPENDIX 
Data definitions 
 
Cash flow: Profit minus taxes minus interest expenses. 
Investment rate: Investment is the sum of investment in property and other tangible assets. It 
is calculated as the difference in the stock of property and other tangible assets in two 
consecutive years. The investment rate is then calculated as the ratio of investment to the 
replacement cost of fixed assets at the end of the previous period. 
Loans: Ratio of bank loans (variable c148 in EXSTAT database) to total assets. 
Net assets: The difference between total assets and total current liabilities. Companies with 
negative net assets are excluded from the sample. 
Retained earnings: Profits available for dividends minus cost of preference dividends minus 
cost of equity dividends, as a percentage of profits available for dividends. 
Size: Net assets deflated by the gross fixed capital formation deflator (GDFCF) series. 
Sales: Total sales or turnover (variable c31 in the EXSTAT database) as a percentage of the 
replacement cost of fixed assets in the previous period. 
Sales growth: The difference between the logarithm of the variable c31 (see explanation: 
sales) in two consecutive years. 
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